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**29 JANUARY 1979**

**(FOUO 8/79)**

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29 January 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE  
(FOUO 8/79)

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## TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

(FOUO 8/79)

### CONTENTS

PAGE

#### FRANCE

Air Force's 1979 Budget Outlined (AIR & COSMOS, 16 Dec 78).....	1
French Naval Air Arm To Receive Super Etendard Aircraft (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 16 Dec 78).....	5
Agave Radar of the Super Etendard Briefly Described (AIR & COSMOS, 16 Dec 78).....	16
First Strategic Missile Group's Security Discussed (Herve Plagnol; TAM, 23 Nov 78).....	18
Launcher, Satellite Construction for Brazil Proposed (Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 23 Dec 78).....	23

#### ITALY

Parliamentarians Predict Government Crisis Within 2 Months (Lorenzo Scheggi; IL MONDO, 5 Jan 79).....	24
Public Opinion Survey on Political Situation (Fabrizio Colsson; PANORAMA, 5 Dec 78).....	30
Public Opinion Poll on PSI Craxi's Strategy (PANORAMA, 12 Dec 78).....	37
Discussion of Poll Findings Bettino Craxi Interview, by Pasquale Nonno Split Within PSI Averted, by Filippo Ceccarelli and Pasquale Nonno	

- a -

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CONTENTS (Continued)

Steel War Between EEC, 'Bresciani'	
(Aldo Santini; L'EUROPEO, 8 Dec 78).....	50
Structure of the Industry Ministry	
(Claudio Torneo; IL MONDO, 6 Dec 78).....	55

-b-

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FRANCE

#### AIR FORCE'S 1979 BUDGET OUTLINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 16 Dec 78 pp 39-40

[Text] The draft of the 1979 Defense budget, as we have twice analyzed it in our issues Nos 732 and 733, was successively passed by the National Assembly (see AIR & COSMOS, No 739) and by the Senate (see page 9 of this issue). It thus becomes a budget in force and it seems opportune to us to restate the broad lines as far as the Air Force is concerned, dealing only with the major programs. For the benefit of the senators Jean Francou and Albert Voilquin have already done that.

#### Air Equipment

Under the "manufacturing" heading program authorizations amount to 7.015 billion francs (+32.6 percent in comparison with the 1978 budget) and funds for disbursement to 4.081 billion francs (+21.5 percent). The percentage increases are greater than the average percentage increase of Chapter V.

Maintaining a fleet of 450 combat aircraft involves replacement of about 35 airplanes each year. This figure, calculated on the basis of an average service life of 18 years for each airplane, was established by taking into account retirement from service due to obsolescence of the airplanes (22 to 25 each year) and the rate of attrition by accident (10 per year). For the first two program years the number of combat aircraft ordered was 30 in 1977 and 33 in 1978. The 1979 budget provides the funds to order 27 airplanes: four Mirage 2000 and 23 Mirage F-1.

Mirage 2000--this defense and air superiority aircraft has been given priority in both studies and construction. It will replace the Mirage III starting in 1982. The 01 prototype flew in March 1978, the 02 in September. The first flight of the 03, with a complete weapons system, is planned for next spring. A two-seat aircraft, partially financed by the manufacturer, will take part in the development program starting in 1980. It is the first four production airplanes (the program law had planned on an order for 20 Mirage 2000 in 1979) which will be ordered within the scope of the 1979 budget. Up to now the funds allocated to this program have been essentially for studies; under the heading of construction 957 million francs were committed. The question that has arisen is whether it will be possible to

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postpone the order for the remaining 16 aircraft to the last 3 years (1980, 1981 and 1982) of the program law. The answer will be given next year when the program law will again be brought up to date as planned.

Along with the test program for the aircraft, SNECMA [National Company for Study and Construction of Aircraft Engines] is continuing the development of the M53-05 turbo-jet which will equip the production versions of the Mirage 2000. The 1979 budget had provided 155 million francs in program authorizations and 162 million francs in funds to be disbursed for this operation. The ground tests of this motor are being supplemented by flight tests aboard a Caravelle and a Mirage F-1.

Mirage F-1--this air defense aircraft, in operational service since 1974, is the present equipment of three pursuit wings, the 12th based at Chambrai (two squadrons), the 30th based at Reims (two squadrons) and the 5th based at Orange (two squadrons). Establishment of a third squadron at Chambrai is now under study, which might signify maintaining in service, with the 10th wing based at Creil, the Mirage IIIC until the Mirage 2000 comes along to replace them.

To the 166 Mirage F-1 airplanes ordered before 1977 the program law has added an order for 109 more to provide for the transition between the Mirage IIIC and the Mirage 2000. By the end of this year 179 airplanes, nine of them two-seat, will have been ordered (including 63 in 1977 and 1978); 23 additional, five of them two-seat, will be financed out of the 1979 budget. The remaining 23 will be ordered between now and 1982. As far as deliveries are concerned, up to now there have been 105; seven F-1 airplanes will be delivered next year. The spreading out of deliveries is due to the fact that a certain number of airplanes are occasionally taken from the production line in order to meet export demands.

Jaquar--Of the 200 aircraft which have been ordered prior to 1977 by the Air Force, 158 will have been delivered by the end of this year, 174 by the end of 1979. The remaining 26 will be delivered starting in 1980.

Alpha Jet--The program law fixed at 144 the number of airplanes of this type to be ordered between 1977 and 1982, the ultimate objective being 200 airplanes. At the end of 1977, 80 airplanes had been ordered, 33 within the scope of the 1978 budget and 22 will be within the scope of the 1979 budget. Six airplanes will have been delivered by the end of this year and 25 will be delivered next year; the first squadron of the Tours Base School (pursuit school) should be completely equipped with Alpha Jet airplanes by the end of autumn 1979. For this program there are 1.050 billion francs of program authorizations in the 1979 budget.

C-160 Transall--For a stated requirement of 25 aircraft, the ordering schedule initially contemplated was as follows: four in 1978, 11 in 1979 and 10 in 1980. Four C-160 airplanes were actually ordered in 1978 but the 1979



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budget (1.159 billion francs in program authorizations) will be able to finance only an order for eight airplanes. Delivery of the first of the 25 is planned in 1981. The conditions for financing the three Transall airplanes which the Posts and Telecommunications ministry will pay back to the Air Force in compensation for the four which the latter leased to the CEPM [expansion unknown] in 1972, are still under discussion.

Training Plane and New Helicopter--For these two aircraft, ordering of which was contemplated in the program law, no funds for manufacture have been provided in 1979.

Air Defense Equipment

Into this category enter the radars, ground anti-aircraft defenses (Crotale [Rattlesnake] ground-air missiles and 20-millimeter guns) and air-air missiles and munitions.

Centaur--this is a homing and landing radar intended to equip military airfields as replacements for the present approach radars. Six units of this type were ordered in 1978; four others will be in 1979.

Aladin--this is a mobile low altitude surveillance radar system (also useable at medium altitudes) intended mainly for tactical use. The first three radars of this type will be ordered within the scope of the 1979 budget.

Satrape--this altimetric radar with electronic elevation scanning will gradually replace the old supplementary equipment of the 23-centimeter warning radars. A production order for four radars was placed in 1974. The first Satrape radar was delivered and installed in 1977; the others will be between now and 1980.

Crotale--Sixteen Crotale sections (let us recall that it is an all-weather, autonomous, and mobile system equipped with ground-air missiles for defense against aircraft at low altitudes) had been ordered prior to 1978; an order for four sections is provided in the 1979 budget. By the end of 1979, 13 sections will have been delivered. Each section comprises an acquisition unit and two firing units, each with four missiles, plus a transport vehicle, an emergency repair unit, and a liaison vehicle. Each squadron comprises two sections (16 missiles). Between now and 1980 eight squadrons will have been established: one at Istres in 1977, two in 1978 (at Avord and Apt), four in 1979, and one in 1980.

Twenty-mm dual-barreled cannon--It is a question of a short-range defense system. Each mount comprises two cannons. The first 40 mounts were ordered as part of the 1978 budget; the first 8 were delivered at the end of this year. The 1979 budget (171 million francs) provided for ordering 56 mounts. The program law provided for 52. The last 56 will be ordered beginning in 1980.

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Air-air Missiles--The lag, up to 1978, in the budgetary section "Armament and Munitions, resulted in a reduction in training for aerial launching and a lowered stock of combat munitions. The 1978 budget marked an upturn. That for 1979 in part makes up for the lag (funds for disbursement increased by 32.9 percent) but the Senate's budget analyst estimates that it falls short of about 200 million francs in program authorizations; this deficiency is going to affect, above all, the acquisition of new munitions. In the 1979 budget there are 228 million francs for ordering the Super 530 and 35 million francs for ordering the Magic. More than 1 million 30-millimeter shells have been ordered, 90 percent of them being training munitions.

Service Equipment and Infrastructure

In 1978 efforts were devoted to construction of equipment necessary to put aircraft and new weapons systems into operation (electrical generating units, and facilities for production and distribution of oxygen and nitrogen). In 1979 service equipment which has more than reached the end of its useful life will be replaced: runway sweepers, maintenance and de-icing platforms, and emergency runway cranes. In another area it is planned to continue the program for acquisition of 70 BIV (armored intervention vehicles) which is to be spread out over 3 years in liaison with the VAB (forward armored vehicles) of the ground forces. In 1979, 36 VIB will be ordered. In 1980 eight will be delivered, in 1981, 33, and in 1982, 29.

The infrastructure represents, for the Air Force, a category of expense which is becoming heavier and heavier. In addition to a "support" infrastructure and a "living quarters" infrastructure, in this category is the responsibility for maintaining in proper condition 44 platforms (runways, ground lighting, parking areas, taxiways, and protective shelters and hangars) whose replacement is cyclical (three or four runways per year). For these expenses the 1979 budget provides 4.5 million francs in program authorizations (+7.8 percent) and 395 million francs in funds for disbursement (+8.9 percent).

Next year the runways at Cognac and Strasbourg will be renovated; partial rebuilding of other platforms will be effected. An additional 20 hangars and shelters will be constructed.

In 1979, 23 million francs will be devoted to improvement of living conditions for non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

The transfer into its new premises of the school at Rochefort (see AIR & COSMOS, No 711) will be entirely accomplished in 1981. For the final segment of that operation the 1979 budget has provided 75 million francs in program authorizations.

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FRANCE

FRENCH NAVAL AIR ARM TO RECEIVE SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 16 Dec 78 pp 21-25

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] Naval aviation makes an indispensable contribution to the performance of the French Navy's missions, especially those which affect the security of the oceanic strategic force, massive interventions and surveillance of the frontiers. The on-board aircraft presently consist of Etendard IVM [Standard IVM] for attack, Crusader for interception, Alize for patrol, and helicopters. Progressively the Etendard, daylight attack aircraft, are being replaced by the Super Etendard [Super Standard], an all-weather attack airplane whose performance, thanks to the equipment and weapons with which it is fitted, is greatly superior to that of its predecessor. Appropriations in the 1979 budget will permit ordering the last six of a production run which will total 71. Twenty-four airplanes will be delivered next year. During the 14 months in the shipyard just completed by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, a number of modifications were made to render the ship capable of putting into operation the Super Etendard aircraft which will carry the tactical nuclear weapon and the AM 39 air-sea missile. The Foch also is going into the yards; it will again be operational in 1981. The Super Etendard and the aircraft carriers aboard which they will be embarked and from which they will be operational during the next 18 years are very much the subject of the following pages.

AIR & COSMOS at this time desires to express its warmest thanks to those in the French Navy who have made this possible: Rear Admiral Fatou, now chief of the French Navy's Aeronautical Division and chief of the Central Aeronautics Bureau, after having been commander of the aircraft carrier group and the on-board aircraft; Captain Doniol, commander of the Foch, and his entire crew; Captain Thireaut, commander of the Landivisian Naval aircraft base; and Lieutenant Commander Argouse, Commander of the 11F naval force, the first in the French Navy to be equipped with this new type of airplane, which indeed appears to be the true "spearhead" of French naval power.--Jean de Galard

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#### A Very Different Airplane From the Etendard IVM

Externally this is a great similarity between the Etendard IVM and the Super Etendard; one would be led to believe that the latter is a rejuvenated version of the former. The fact of the matter is quite different although it is mainly the pilots who are in position to appreciate the progress which has been achieved.

The differences have to do, on the one hand, with a number of technological improvements of details (greater equipment reliability and less heavy maintenance) and, on the other hand, with three essential points: modified aerodynamics, a motor with lower specific fuel consumption, and highly modern equipment.

The modifications related to the aerodynamics are all in the direction of increasing the lift: the tips of the leading edges have been extended to the extremities of the wings, the flaps have a new profile and their travel has been extended, and the elevator has been redesigned.

In comparison with the Atar 8C with which the Etendard IVM is equipped, the new Atar 8K50 of SNECMA [National Company for Study and Construction of Aircraft Engines], without afterburner and with fixed nozzle, provides a gain in thrust on the order of 500 kilograms and more brilliant performance with lower specific consumption (about 8 to 10 percent).

Those are substantial improvements which by themselves contribute to making the Super Etendard an airplane whose performance is superior to that of the Etendard IVM. But, in the area of equipment the aircraft has been radically transformed, and the equipment installed aboard the Super Etendard vertifiably make it a fighter airplane of the new generation. As a matter of fact there are on board--to mention only the most spectacular equipment--an inertial navigation and attack system, a radar (Agave) which operates in air-air, air-surface, and telemetry modes, and a heads up display (HUD) for presentation of piloting and attack data at the level of the pilot's eyes. Later on other equipment will supplement the foregoing: a VOR/ILS [Visual omni-range/instrument landing system], an automatic pilot, and an automatic throttle.

As for the armament of the Super Etendard, it is in keeping with the greatly improved performance of the airplane: the four carrying points fixed under the wings (two on each side) can each hold 400-kilogram and 250-kilogram bombs and rocket launchers. To the carrying point fixed under the fuselage two 250-kilogram bombs or a jettisonable tank of 600 liters or a spout for refueling in flight can be attached. For attack at sea the most effective weapon will be the Aerospatiale [National Industrial Aerospace Company] AM-39 air-sea missile whose range is greater than 40 kilometer and which is self-guided. For aerial dogfights, especially at altitudes below 25,000 feet, the Super Etendard equipment with two Magic missiles

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in addition to its two 30-millimeter guns will be able to perform interceptions by day and by night. Last, let us bear in mind that the Super Etendard can carry the tactical weapon. All of these various improvements of course provide very great advantages at the operational level; thanks to increased lift the mass which can be catapulted, at a given speed, has gone from 10.8 to 12 tons, which enables the charges carried and the fuel supply to be increased, and hence the radius of action; with two suspended tanks of 1,100 liters (instead of 600 liters in the case of the Etendard IVM) the total fuel capacity is increased from 3,500 to 4,800 kilograms; the carrying capacity for military loads (with only internal fuel capacity) goes from 1,300 to 2,100 kilograms; the approach speed at 7.8 tons goes from 133 to 122 knots, which permits landing on deck with winds on deck on the order of 18 knots, or even to return to the deck with some military loads. Particularly in warm climates these advantages are especially significant.

As far as the motor is concerned, the fixed nozzle solution made establishment of control a delicate matter. Flight certification of the Atar AK50 for the Super Etendard was indeed issued several months ago. This does not mean that a number of necessary modifications are not still in progress and the first airplanes equipped with the definitive motor in the version desired by the navy will be delivered only in the course of the year 1979. These modifications are mainly concerned with pick-up at low altitudes. In the meantime several utilization restrictions will be necessary when the airplane is placed into service aboard aircraft carriers.

The Etendard IVM pilots have become virtuosi of the charts by using the compass heading and the clock as accessories. The pilots of the Super Etendard will be practically free of navigational concerns; they will only have to exercise surveillance over it. They will therefore be able to devote themselves to the tasks of observing the sea or the terrain or surveillance of the sky. As for firing (guns, bombs, or rockets) it will be effected with increased precision and effectiveness, which will reduce the number of munitions to be utilized. On pages 26 and 27 [of source publication] the reader will find additional information on the ensemble of these facilities, as well as on the method used aboard the aircraft carriers to align the inertial platform.

## At Landivisian

The first two Super Etendard airplanes delivered to the French Navy (Nos 3 and 4 of the production run) started out in July with the Practical Evaluation Commission at Istres. Along with No 2, during that month they recorded a total of some 60 flight hours. They then went to the base at Landivisian where they were assigned to the 11F naval force which, under command of Lieutenant Commander Argouse, is the first unit of the French Navy to be equipped with this type of aircraft. The third airplane (No 5 of the production run) came to the 11F in September, the fourth (No 6 of the production run) in October, and the fifth (No 7 of the production run)

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on 10 November. With these airplanes the pilots of the 11F flew a total of 100 hours in September (airplanes Nos 3 and 4), 167 hours in October (airplanes Nos 3, 4 and 5) and 220 hours in November (airplanes Nos 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). It can be believed that the total number of flying hours effected at Landivision from 4 September--the date the first two airplanes were taken in charge--up to 31 December 1978 by the Super Etendard pilots of the 11F will have reached 600. Activity in December will have been somewhat reduced because of the first trials at sea aboard the aircraft carrier Foch performed from the 4th to the 8th and upon which we report on subsequent pages.

The 11F will have received its full complement of 12 airplanes at the end of the month of February 1979. Next it will be the turn of the 14F naval force, also based at Landivision, and whose first pilots will be trained by the instructors of the 11F, to receive its 12 Super Etendard aircraft to replace its Crusader aircraft. This second force is supposed to be organized in September 1979. In July 1980 the third force, the 17F based at Hyeres and up to now equipped with the Etendard IVM, will in its turn be organized. Each force includes 18 pilots, each of them flying an average of 18 hours per month.

As there exists within naval aviation no equivalent to the CEAM [Military Aircraft Experimentation Center], at Mont-de-Marsan, of the Air Force it will be the 11F naval force which for 1 year will have to be responsible for operational experimentation with the Super Etendard, that is, it is going to establish the procedures for employing the aircraft.

During the early period of placing the first Super Etendard aircraft into service at Landivision the availability ratio was considered good--on the order of 65 percent. Certainly, some equipment breakdowns were encountered but they were neither frequent nor of long duration. While awaiting reception of an ATEC inspection and repair bench which AEROSPATIALE will deliver to Landivision at the end of the year all defective equipment has been returned to the manufacturer.

The operating capability between overhauls of the 8K50 motor is 180 hours. At Landivision, on the occasion of our visit to the base at the end of last month, there were two spare motors. Aside from the motors, the spare parts stock, considering the necessary long lead times, on that occasion seemed to be a matter of concern for the commander of the force.

Training of technicians preceded that of the pilots. At the end of November there were 10 pilots to have received their qualification with the Super Etendard; these were the ones who were, several days later, to land, for the first time, Super Etendard aircraft on the deck of the Foch. Practically all of them are former Etendard IVM pilots.

Technicians and pilots are making ready to receive, next May, a maintenance simulator now being completed at Toulouse under AEROSPATIALE supervision.

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It will be placed into operation by the technical instruction section but will also serve the pilots as a "systems" simulator. Another simulator of this type will be installed at Hyeres in 1980.

By Easter of 1980 the 11F is supposed to have available a flight simulator constructed by LMT which will make possible visual simulation of night landing.

In the coming months the No 2 airplane at Istres will be used for performance of tests of the automatic pilot. In much simplified terms its main function will be to maintain altitude. The Super Etendard pilots will then be able to carry out missions at very low altitudes above the sea by using the radar.

Experimentation with the Super Etendard-AM39 combination will not begin before 1980; it will follow that with the Magic for which the adaptation arms will be delivered next year at the same time as the adaptation arms for the 400-kilogram bombs to the exterior attachment points.

Aboard the Foch

While the Clemenceau, upon conclusion of its modifications in the yards, was continuing, since 24 November, its sea trials, the Foch, off the coast of Toulon, was, during 4 days at sea in the beginning of this month, effecting the first "homings" and catapult take-offs of a first group of five Super Etendard aircraft arriving for the first time directly from Landivisian. At the beginning of this test series it had been planned to retrain 10 pilots for the super Etendard, all of them already qualified for the Etendard IVM. This objective was achieved.

Landing on the deck is always a delicate maneuver involving the landing officer, the pilot, the aircraft, and the aircraft carrier. The responsibility of the first named is very great since it is he who ultimately decides--depending upon the conditions with which he is faced: presentation of the aircraft upon approach, motion of the platform, and force of the wind upon the deck--whether the pilot can land under satisfactory conditions or whether he should apply power and abort the landing. If the movements of the platform are great he has available a manual optical instrument to take the place of the landing mirror stabilized in pitch. During the entire approach phase he is in radio communication with the pilot who must strictly obey his instructions.

The Landing Officers School, which is at Hyeres and whose first commander is the present "skipper" of the Foch, trains these officers, who must not only be pilots themselves but must have been qualified with all types of on-board aircraft in service in the naval air arm.

To be a "qualified pilot" for any type of aircraft, there must be effected 15 to 20 sessions of simulated landings on a runway, at the rate of eight passes per session, then, aboard aircraft carriers, two TAG (Touch and Go)

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and six CAC (Catch and Catapult), the latter consisting of a landing immediately followed by a catapult take-off. A "confirmed" pilot for a given airplane has, depending upon the degree of his training, performed 30 landings on deck with that type of airplane and is capable of fulfilled all missions without recourse to a landing field.

The first test series with the production Super Etendard aboard the Foch proceeded satisfactorily despite 2 days of bad weather. The first results, especially as far as the operations of alignment at sea in heavy swells of a large number of aircraft, were judged satisfactory. They confirmed the results which had been obtained on the ground.

The next test series will take place aboard the Clemenceau in the beginning of spring.

One of the lessons we learned in the course of this first test series is that, according to a comparison dear to the heart of Admiral Fatou, the sailing ship and the aircraft carrier have this in common: they are both greatly subject to the wind....

The Advantages of the Super Etendard

The modification work carried out for 14 months on the aircraft carrier Clemenceau had a three-fold purpose: to modernize all the ECM [electronic counter measures] equipment and install the SENIT 2; improve living conditions on board; and adapt the ship to the Super Etendard. For this adaptation the workshops had to be suitably arranged (putting an ATEC bench into operation); likewise the munition bunkers for storage of AM-39 and AN-52 weapons; it was also necessary to install the equipment and reference systems required for use of the inertial navigation system installed upon the aircraft.

In several months the Foch will undergo the same series of modifications, which will be completed in 1981.

During the normal life of an aircraft carrier, Admiral Fatou explains, the maintenance cycle is heavy. Out of a 50 to 52-month period there is about 3 years of availability either as an airplane or helicopter carrier, interrupted by three IPER (periodic maintenance and repair inspections), one of which is on the order of 8 months, the other two of duration of 3 to 4 months (not to mention the lack of availability due to maintenance as required on which is not regular). In maintenance of aircraft carriers the operations of catapult inspection play a very great role because they have utilization limitations and requirements which must be rigorously respected. Each catapult must be completely inspected (time in the shop: 5 months) every 5,000 take-offs; in between it receives two extensive inspections (time in the shop: 21 days) every 2,000 take-offs, plus a 3-day inspection every 400 take-offs. On the average, with two catapults 40 take-offs can be provided for each of 100 pilots per year; as a matter of fact it must



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be taken into consideration that not all of the 5,000 take-offs are useable because of operational needs (calibration, empty launches, or model launches: a loss of more than 10 percent).

Therefore anything that makes possible a savings in the use of the catapult is considered an advantage; in comparison with its predecessor the Super Etendard in this respect provides a great advantage because of its much greater autonomy. For an equal number of catapult take-offs it is always interesting to totalize the maximum number of flying hours. In this respect the cycle of the Super Etendard may be close to that of the Crusader which is itself greater than that of the Etendard IVM. In the matter of deck sequences (landings on deck followed by catapult take-offs) the catapult will have to operate less frequently since "homings" will have to be effected only about every 100 minutes (instead of every 70 with the Etendard IVM). There will also result less fatigue for the personnel.

Another advantage of the Super Etendard, which Admiral Fatou emphasizes: by virtue of its increased lift its speed of presentation upon the deck is lower than that of the Etendard IVM, which decreases wear upon the stopping cables and reduces the danger of breakage (in this case only the speed need be taken into consideration; the mass does not enter).

A third advantage, and not the least, of the Super Etendard is that it will be an excellent means of information to the command at sea, in long distance detection. It will report what it sees and localize it.

For all these reasons, specifically related to the ship-aircraft combination, the admiral who before 1 December commanded the group of aircraft carriers and the on-board aircraft did not conceal his satisfaction at seeing the Super Etendard enter into service with the French Navy.



Aboard the aircraft carrier Foch on 5 December 1978 the Super Etendard No 6, carrying a mock-up of the AM-39 missile under its starboard wing, rolls toward the catapult area. (Photographs pp 21-27 by Michel Isaac).

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The first Super Etendard aircraft delivered to the French Navy on the deck of the Foch (at left) and on the base at Landivisian



A Touch-and-Go sequence aboard the Foch, The airplane is in landing position (hook not extended) at left and takes off again immediately at right

12  
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
The Super Etendard No 7 at Landivisian (at left) and several days later aboard the Foch.



Opposite, from top to bottom, the Super Etendard No 5 returned to operation aboard the Foch after returning from a mission; the same upon the lateral elevator.

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A catapult sequence with a Super Etendard aboard the Foch. Underneath its starboard wing the airplane carries a mock-up of the AM-39 missile.

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FRANCE

AGAVE RADAR OF THE SUPER ETENDARD BRIEFLY DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 16 Dec 78 p 27

[Text] The Agave radar was developed cooperatively by Thomson-CSF and Marcel Dassault Electronics.

It is designed for multi-purpose combat aircraft to fulfill the following functions:

air-air--search, tracking, designation of objectives and telemetry;

air-sea--search for ships, automatic tracking, designation of objectives, and telemetry; and


air-ground--navigation and telemetry

The Agave is a one-piece unit weighing 45 kilograms. It measures only 49 centimeters in diameter by 61 centimeters long. Its electrical power consumption is 1.1 kilowatts. Thus it is very compact without, for all that, any impairment of its performance. In the air-air mode it can detect a light bomber 15 nautical miles away and in the air-sea mode a destroyer at more than 60 miles. The antenna is of inverted Cassegrain type stabilized in pitch and roll. The bearing segment swept is 140 degrees. Transmission is effected in the X band, the impulse width and repetition frequency being adapted to the mission or to the conditions under which the mission is performed. Likewise the beam width can be adjusted for a better map picture or to improve detection in the air-air mode at medium altitudes.

A self-surveillance system makes it possible for the pilot to be informed of the operational state of his radar. On the ground this system enables a defective part to be rapidly located. This radar is of modular design, which facilitates maintenance.


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View of cockpit of the Super Etendard. The reference numbers 1-9 indicate the following equipment: 1) SFIM three-axis altitude indicator; 2) Thomson-CSF VE 120 sight unit; 3) Jaeger altimeter; 4) Crouzet weapons box; 5) Socrat VHF radio; 6) LMT IFF; 7) Sagem ETNA system control post; 8) LMT Jacan; and 9) Crouzet weapons box (Michel Isaac photo)

The Thomson-CSF VE 120 sight unit with which all the Super Etendard aircraft are equipped. It consists of a cathode ray sight lead, a symbol generating computer, and a gyroscopic sensor. It also takes over a part of the fire control calculations.



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FRANCE

# FIRST STRATEGIC MISSILE GROUP'S SECURITY DISCUSSED

Paris TAM in French 23 Nov 78 p 10

[Article by Herve Plagnol: "Being a Draftee in the 1st Strategic Missile Group"]

[Text] Stroll around the base of the 1st GMS [Strategic Missile Group], ask a few questions of the draftees about their work and responsibilities, and you may be sure that in a few minutes a telephone call will have reported you to the Base Security and Defense Services (MSP) as an intruder who has come to ask very inappropriate questions on a strategic base.

Secrecy and security are not empty words on the Apt [Vaucluse Dept.] Base. Perhaps more than anywhere else, the draftees there have their part to play and their responsibilities to assume in regard to the strategic nuclear force. Much has been written and said to the effect that, once our national defense was based on nuclear deterrence, the need for conscription would no longer exist. Come make a visit to Apt with the MSP or the Technical Operation and Maintenance Group (GTMM) and you will discover differently. Get the soldiers to talk about the "disengagement,"\* and you will learn that they do not see it as such.

The 1000 draftees are commanded by a general, under whose direction we find the strategic missile brigade headquarters and the support services headquarters. The strategic missile brigade headquarters commands the personnel responsible for direct operation of the missiles and the technicians responsible for maintenance and repair of equipment, and for communications. The support services headquarters is in charge of security and other general services. Military service in the 1st GMS may consist of service in these two commands. So much for the headquarters organization.

To see how the draftees live and actually take part in the operation of the strategic nuclear force, we went to live among them for several days.

\* Disengagement: expression being currently used to designate the operation in progress consisting of replacement [exchange] of the SSBS S2 missiles with those of the next generation, S3's.

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During our brief stay, we met mainly those of the MSP, the EP (Base Defense Squadron), the SSIS (Fire Safety and Rescue Section), the SSN (Nuclear Safety Section), the GTMM, and the CICA (Air Force Guard-Dog Training Center).

Base Defense

On Wednesday evening, an entire company of the Defense Squadron commenced an exercise in the area, which lasted 24 hours. A drop by one of three Puma helicopters at an unfamiliar point on the plateau, a reconnaissance check of the zone, an orientation march, and return to the base in a Puma made up that day's exercise. Tired but content with having limbered up their legs, they explained their mission: "In general, when the silos are operational, we are alerted by electronic means if something is wrong. In such a case, we must be prepared to react immediately. However, when they are open and personnel are working in them, there is a permanent watch. We also screen those entering and leaving certain zones. These are our constant responsibilities."

Do they feel more useful here? Obviously, they do. "One does not guard 18 bombs, each having a power of '10 times Hiroshima,' without feeling a greater sense of importance than elsewhere. To be assigned to this mission required 7-8 weeks of training at Nîmes. For some, this training included paratrooper training and qualification at Pau. In all, they will have a chance to make at least 10 jumps during their tour of service."

For the Albion plateau commandos, secrecy is the rule. Don't ask them how many of them go into action. They will simply answer...a few. Equipped with the newest in materiel (Sartron cameras, night-vision scopes, and soon, armored combat vehicles), their activities are many: defense of the installations, patrols on the base, control of the surrounding terrain, night maneuvers, patrols, rapid interventions, and screening operation. Their work is not always rosy. But was it meant to be? Often waiting, but always on the alert, their mission requires that they provide unfailing mutual support. You will never see a lone commando. Whether on their way to the mess, to the lounge, or to the cinema, the berets, ranger uniforms and combat boots group together spontaneously. To ensure uninterrupted availability, the Defense Squadron is divided into four companies, which are rotated successively through four defense postures: surveillance, alert, training, rest. However, every person on the base must be capable of fulfilling his responsibilities. One of the watchwords of the draftees is "operational."

Another special aspect of the work performed by the 1st GMS is their ongoing relationship with the civilian population. It is not unusual for the military Pumas to carry hay to the farmers in winter, water in summer, or to find sheep that have strayed, and, above all, to fight forest fires. This is another reason to recognize the importance of the role of the draftees.

The SSIS is exemplary in this regard. Composed in great part of volunteers, it covers the base, the silos and assistance to the civilians of the plateau.

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Unlike the soldiers of the Defense Squadron, the firemen are trained on the base itself, after completing their initial period of basic military training.

Their training and equipment are specially designed for swift action against all forms of fire. Their "motor-ventilator equipment," for example, is an interesting apparatus designed to suck up or blow away any toxic gases produced by a fire inside one of the silos. In a matter of minutes, the soldiers can climb the enormous tube at the end of the electric pump, ready to fight the fire. In the worst cases, their all-asbestos suits provide excellent protection against the flames. Another piece of equipment, the VLEM (Heavy Foam Extinguisher Vehicle), a giant truck, pumps loads of foam for 4-6 minutes. About 75 draftees are assigned to operate this equipment, under team chiefs, each of whom is responsible for one vehicle and one team consisting of one driver and several firemen. Besides their initial specialist training on the base, the personnel receive one hour daily of further refresher on-the-job training. Surprise exercises are frequently sprung. "At those times, we all crave to take part. Those who must remain behind envy the others. Our mission? We derive our greatest sense of involvement from having to be there from the moment the silos are opened, and particularly during the 'disengagement.'"

One of the firemen is so passionately fond of his work that he forms part of a civilian fire brigade while on military pass or leave.

#### The Guard-Dog Group

For the draftees assigned to the dog care and training group, it is equally a labor of love. On Thursday morning, the dog named "Cent" was operated on for a cyst on the neck by the assistant veterinarian. No anesthesia. The dog was simply held by his trainer, a draftee, who controlled him by caressing him to convey to him the presence of his master. One would have to have seen the looks exchanged between them to appreciate the environment that prevails here. Each one speaks of his dog, recalling the number of competitions it has won, or simply displaying the medal dangling from the animal's collar. There are reasons. The life of the dog is totally entrusted to the responsibility of the soldier. As in most services of the 1st GMS.

The guard-dog group has one particularity: It is working on an experimental training mission, the first to be undertaken by the air force. Each draftee assigned to this duty is given responsibility for two animals—above all, for grooming them and developing their fighting spirit. Only thus can they be trained as combat dogs.

"The hardest thing," said one draftee, "is to part with your dog. The new master sometimes has trouble in being accepted. During the first days, the dog is ready to jump all over him. The dog must be approached gradually, talked to and caressed. When one is able to enter its cage, he knows he has been accepted." Another soldier, an electrician prior to his tour of service, told me he has succeeded in finding a job as a dog trainer when he becomes separated from the service.

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The work here is especially exacting. The rounds are made on privately - owned terrain, which requires exceptional diligence on the part of the dog's master to avoid accidents. Training is therefore extremely important. What with making the rounds, caring for and training the dogs, and the training of the men themselves, there is certainly no lack of activity in the guard-dog group of the 1st GMS.

The "Disengagement" [Missile Exchange]

"The 'disengagement'? That was extremely interesting. There we really got close to the missiles. And the firing controls, too. This was necessary for the conversion to the S3 system," as it was explained to me by one of the 90 soldiers who had taken part in the dismantling of the silos. The "disengagement" had been their affair, their mission. Fifteen days of preparation had been required. One does not work inside the 25-meter-deep wells without good training as a first-aid specialist. Some have qualified for certification. Others have had light but useful training in other technical fields: "As for me, I am a tinsmith in civilian life, and I can be helpful to this job. What needs to be done? Dismantle the silos completely so that the engineers can refit them for the S3 system."

After completion of their training, the work is organized: three teams of six soldiers each, plus a cadre, per silo. "Sure, at the beginning, the cadres showed us what had to be done, but from then on we all did the same work, and that was great. A big tent was set up where everybody ate together, regardless of rank. The general came in to eat with us several times." "Of course," said another, "we did not get directly involved with the missiles. That pertained to the specialists. But we made it possible for them to work."

In all, 90 draftees from three different contingents took part in this famous "disengagement." The Defense teams were in special demand: the SSIS firemen to extinguish the flash fires started by the oxy-acetylene welding torches, and the riflemen-commandos to control and guard the security of the launching zones. In 3 months nine silos and one firing control center had been "disengaged" for conversion to next generation S3 silos. The draftees are well aware that "the new system is simpler and more efficient. The missiles will also have a longer life."

When the first nine silos have been fully converted, a new group of draftees will take part in the "disengagement" of the next nine. Those who were most impressed were the ones who had worked on a firing control position. This is a "capsule" approximately 8 meters by 4 meters enclosed in a steel and concrete block weighing 45 tons. The firing control position from the exterior is separated by 400 meters of rock and 1600 meters of labyrinthian galleries.

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Some Have Technical Assignments

We were not able to meet with them at their work stations, which were situated in tightly controlled security zones, and they were very uncommunicative regarding their activities. However, we did learn that certain draftees having well-defined technical skills were working on the missiles and are taking part in the technical documentation of the new materiel for the next system.

The foregoing lines have endeavored to convey how being an air force draftee can mean taking a direct part in defense operations to the astonishment of a sedentary reporter in Paris.

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FRANCE

LAUNCHER, SATELLITE CONSTRUCTION FOR BRAZIL PROPOSED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 23 Dec 78 p 43

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] A mission from the National Center for Space Studies (CNES) which also includes some French industrialists will go to Brazil on 5-9 February 1979 to present the Brazilian government with various possibilities for space cooperation between the two countries. It will be a "technical presentation" on cooperation and a follow-up to previous French proposals for the carrying out of a joint space mission. Colonel Hugo de Oliveira Piva, director of the Brazilian Institute for Space Activities, recently announced that Brazilian authorities have just accepted the French proposal in principle.

Brazil is particularly interested in building a 120-150 kg satellite for practical use in ground observation and meteorology, a rocket for use in launching this satellite and a launching pad from which the rocket would be fired. The launching pad would be located in Natal where Brazil already has a small facility for launching atmospheric probes. The details of the project have yet to be settled, particularly insofar as the rocket is concerned. CNES has proposed using a liquid propellant first stage (cf. AIR & COSMOS no. 719).

Final acceptance of the French plan, Colonel Piva explained, will depend on negotiations undertaken with CNES on issues such as the transfer of technology, cost, technical characteristics and scientific applications. As far as transfer of technology is concerned, Colonel Piva stated that among the industrialized countries France and Germany were the most disposed to participate. In fact, Brazil has placed France and Germany in competition for the project to build launch facilities and a satellite. The United States has declined to participate.

It may appear surprising that France, which already has a well equipped launch facility in Kourou, French Guiana (Brazil's neighbor), would want to construct a foreign installation able to compete with it. Brazil however prefers to have its own firing pad rather than to use the CSG [expansion unknown].

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ITALY

PARLIAMENTARIANS PREDICT GOVERNMENT CRISIS WITHIN 2 MONTHS

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 5 Jan 79 pp 8-11

[Article by Lorenzo Scheggi: "Giulio To Follow Giulio"; opinion survey carried out between Tuesday, 12 December, and Monday, 18 December, through a questionnaire consisting of six questions that was sent to all members of parliament (deputies and senators). Responses were received from 238, in other words, 25 percent of those questioned, broken down into 140 deputies (22.2 percent) and 98 senators (31.1 percent). Out of the total number of responses, therefore, the Chamber accounted for 58.8 percent while the Senate came up with 41.2 percent. The questionnaire called for unstructured responses. But, analyzing and classifying the responses, those that were politically homogeneous were grouped together (see tables and graphs). The survey was given on the basis of guaranteed anonymity. But some of the deputies and senators did sign their questionnaires. They include the following deputies: Carlo Squeri, Massimo De Carolis, Mario Clemente Mastella, Luigi Rossi di Montelera, Giuseppe Lucchesi, Giacinto Urso, of the DC [Christian Democratic Party]; Michele De Gregorio and Lucio Libertini, of the PCI; Enrico Quaranta and Stefano Servadei, of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], Secretary Pietro Longo and Matteo Matteotti, of the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party]; Massimo Gorla, of Proletarian Democracy, as well as senators Adolfo Sarti and Carlo Romei, of the DC, and MIS [Italian Social Movement] member Giorgio Pisano.]

[Text] How many months has the administration left? Who will take Andreotti's place? And what is the ideal majority for this legislative session? Questioned by IL MONDO, deputies and senators agreed on only one point.

After Andreotti we are going to have Andreotti again: the government crisis is now inevitable but a new administration, similar to the present one or with a definitely more open attitude toward the left, will emerge from it, including left-wing experts in some key ministries and the current prime minister will again be in charge of it. This is what emerges from a survey conducted by IL MONDO (see box insert) among all of the members of parliament who--contrary to all predictions by political experts who think that Andreotti has had it--believe instead in the rise of the phoenix, the bird that rises from its own ashes.

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But there are no doubts as to the crisis. We find that 67.7 percent of the responses indicate that it will certainly come within 2 months. For example, one month is the time limit indicated by PSDI secretary Pietro Longo in his response. Somebody even wrote rather stonily on the questionnaire: "You can count the days." The moment parliament resumes its session, therefore, the administration--according to the overwhelming majority of those questioned--will no longer be able to hold out. It will presumably fall in connection with the Pandolfi plan. The remaining 32.3 percent are rather optimistic and give the present cabinet several more months in office. They practically say that this administration should stay in office until the European election. But nobody looks much beyond that: no answer, as a matter of fact, expects the administration to last more than a year.

But what will come out of this crisis? The individuals questioned do not think that the assumption of early elections could be sustained; only 11.8 percent as a matter of fact believe that there will be no solution to the government crisis; 88.2 percent on the other hand expect the formation of a new government. In other words, a new administration within the first month of 1979. But not an entirely new administration at that. According to 36.8 percent of the members of parliament questioned, the solution will be very similar to the present one. The technically formulated assumptions are numerous: from single-color to two-color and on to various other combinations. But there is only one political assumption here: a government put up by a majority, such as the present one, in other words, including the five parties, also once again expanded to include the Liberals who had already been in the preceding cabinet. The chairman of the Chamber's transportation committee, the communist Lucio Libertini, also said that "I am afraid that the current majority might fall under the blows of the DC right wing which wants the crisis in order to revise its anticommunist campaign." This would have the result that the PCI would go into the opposition, commented an anonymous senator, and that will open the way to violence by armed groups. The percentage of those who foresee a more significant change however is higher. According to 50 percent of the responses, as a matter of fact, the next administration will include left-wing technicians. In summary, expressed in plain language, half of the members of parliament who responded think that the PCI will manage to strengthen its position further, guaranteeing its position through the entry, into the government team, of persons it approves of, especially at the head of the economic ministries. Overall, the two assumptions--either a rehash of the current formula or the entry of left-wing technicians--cover all possibilities, in other words, 86.8 percent. The remainder of 13.2 percent is divided: 6.6 percent for the left-of-center and 6.6 percent for the right-of-center.

But regardless of the winning solution in terms of formulas, Andreotti has the most chance, compared to any other competitor, of once again getting his desk back in Chigi Palace. The predictions of precisely one-half of those questioned as a matter of fact are in his favor. The others follow after a long interval: Piccoli, in second place, got 17.6 percent of the responses; Forlani, in third place, got 14.7 percent. And Filippo Maria Pandolfi,

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the minister of finance, one of the new personalities in the DC, gets about 6 percent, less than what the surviving race horse, Amintore Fanfani, got with 8.9 percent.

So much for the predictions. But what, on the other hand, will be the solutions and the formula for the administration and the men whom the members of parliament would like to have?

The first fact that emerges is the scarcity of consensus on the assumption that left-wing technicians will enter the government; only 11.7 percent prognosticate such a formation (as against 50 percent who consider it probable). In this connection, however, we have 17.7 percent who came out directly in favor of letting communists into the government. The votes in favor of the assumption as to a new administration similar to the present one, that is to say, 35.2 percent, are more balanced, compared to those obtained by way of prediction. The votes in favor of early elections are also balanced, with 11.7 percent. Massimo De Carolis (who wrote that he was afraid of an administration with left-wing technicians in it) and Luigi Rossi di Montelera, who as an alternative would accept only a left-of-center government, came out in favor of this assumption. But Massimo Gorla, of Proletarian Democracy, also came out in favor of early elections; he predicted an electoral administration presided over by Flaminio Piccoli. Finally, MIS member Giorio Pisano asked for early elections; but he wants the electoral administration to be headed by Amintore Fanfani.

The next question ("Regarding the kind of administration you considered opportune, who should be the prime minister?") drastically redimensions Giulio Andreotti. Although it does as a matter of fact give him a very large number of responses in terms of forecasts, the votes he actually got as the ideal candidate dropped tremendously from 50 down to 20.6 percent. This drop is essentially do to the decline in confidence among left-wing members of parliament, as demonstrated by a check on the questionnaire forms of those who came out either in favor of letting the PCI into the administration or in favor of letting PCI-approved technicians into the government; among those, none voted for Andreotti. But here, Andreotti is followed by Pandolfi with 12 percent and, after a short interval, with 11.7 percent, by Arnaldo Forlani [and] Flaminio Piccoli and then, gradually, by Fanfani, La Malfa, Francesco Cossiga, and Antonio Giolitte. In addition to indicating the prime minister considered most suitable, many of the responses provided detailed organizational charts for the entire administration. Very many solutions were advanced: practically one for every response. Some were absolutely devoid of any innovative proposals whereas others instead (see box insert) contained an abundance of innovations and unique solutions; generally speaking, there are three tendencies.

Combination of ministries. These essentially involve the economic ministries. The proposal that got the most votes relates to combining [the Ministry of] Budget, Treasury, and Finance under the leadership--in most cases--of Pandolfi. Other proposals for example relate to tourism and entertainment, which should

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be combined with cultural assets and environment--a proposal that was linked, among others, to the names of Dario Antoniazzi or Susanna Agnelli or Franca Falcucci. The ministries of industry and of government participation, of public works and of the South should also be combined. One particularly interesting proposal finally calls for setting up a single Ministry of Services [Utilities] which should include the authority of [the ministries] of transportation, merchant marine, post office, health, tourism, and cultural assets. This tendency was summarized by an anonymous deputy with the following slogan: "Reduce the ministries, cut the undersecretaries in half."

Technicians. The overwhelming majority of responses foresees that technicians will be included in the administration. Romano Prodi got the most votes; for some people, as a matter of fact, he should switch ministries, going over to [the Ministry of] Government Partnerships. But there are other names in addition to his, such as the names of Guido Carli, president of Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry] (proposed for government partnerships), Umberto Nordio, president of Alitalia (also for government partnerships), Paolo Baffi, governor of the Bank of Italy (for the Treasury), as well as Gen Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa, proposed for the Ministry of Internal Affairs by DC senator Carlo Romei. Openly against the technicians, on the other hand, was Clemente Mastella, a DC deputy, who wrote that he was not in agreement with the idea of employing them: "They are going to be used in a stable context but under political guidance. Their presence adds to the discredit of the institutions."

New names. Very many proposals were advanced here and some of them kept coming up. The name of Fabrizio Cicchitto, the PSI's economic chief, for example appears as the ideal minister of the budget, the regions, the South, and finance; the name of Maria Eletta Martini, a Christian Democrat and vice president of the Chamber [was mentioned] for public education, health, and in connection with many other ministries. The names of former ministers also come up again: from Giovanni Gioia to Giovanni Malagodi, who is dug up again as minister of the treasury assuming that there will be a right-of-center administration, headed by Amintore Fanfani, and Carlo Donat Cattin for the Ministry of the Interior whose program should be: "early and repeated elections to achieve a definite clarification." The response from one anonymous DC deputy finally is worth mentioning; he filled in the box for the ministry of government participations only with a rather stony: "Not Bisaglia."

## The Ideal Cabinet

Almost all members of parliament who responded to the questionnaire also indicated the best administration to bring us up to the end of the legislative session. The most unique one involves a coalition government including the DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI [Italian Republican Party], and left-wing independents as technicians, supported by the PCI and set up as follows:

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Prime Minister: Ugo La Malfa; Interior: Giacomo Mancini; Foreign Affairs: Mauro Ferri; Justice: Paolo Rossi; Public Education: Francesco De Martino; Defense: Falco Accame; Finance, Treasury, and Budget: Filippo Maria Pandolfi; Territory and transportation (public works, transportation and merchant marine, post office, cultural assets): Pietro Padula; Economy (agriculture and forestry, industry, foreign trade, government partnerships, tourism and entertainment): Amintore Fanfani; Social Matters (labor and health): Pietro Bucalossi; Fund for the South: Claudio Napoleoni.

Question 1. How many months does the present administration have left?

	Chamber %	Senate %	Total %
Up to 2 months	73.2	57.2	67.7
Between 2 months and 1 year	26.8	42.8	32.3
More than 1 year	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100

Question 2. How will the crisis turn out?

[Response] New administration: Chamber 84%; Senate 92.8%; total -8.2%.

[Response] Early elections: Chamber 16%; Senate 7.2%; total 11.8%.

Question 3. What will be the formula for the new administration?

	Chamber %	Senate %	Total %
Like present one (including assumptions of single-color or coalition government put up by majority of five or six with PLI [Italian Liberal Party])	52.9	15.4	36.8
PCI will enter government	—	—	—
Single-color DC or coalition with PCI-approved technician	41.2	61.6	50
Left-of-center	—	15.4	6.6
Right-of-center	5.9	7.6	6.6
Total	100	100	100

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Question 4. Who will be the next prime minister?

Andreotti: Chamber 53.5%; Senate 43.1%.  
 Forlani: Chamber 15.5%; Senate 14.2%.  
 Piccoli: Chamber 10.7%; Senate 28.5%.  
 Fanfani: Chamber 10.0%; Senate 7.1%.  
 Pandolfi: Chamber [only] 10.3%.

Miscellaneous: [no entry].

No response: Senate: 7.1%.

Question 5. What administration and what majority would be best to conclude the legislative session?

	Chamber %	Senate %	Total %
Like present (including assumptions as to single-color or coalition government with majority of five or six also including PLI)	36.4	35.7	35.2
Early elections	9.6	14.2	11.7
PCI in government	10.2	28.5	17.7
Single-color administration or coalition with left-wing technicians	15.6	7.4	11.7
Left-of-center	10.9	7.1	8.9
Right-of-center	13.0	—	8.9
Other	4.3	7.1	5.9
Total	100	100	100

Question 6. Assuming we have the administration considered best, who should be the prime minister?

Andreotti: Chamber 20.3%; Senate 21.4%.  
 Forlani: Chamber 10.7%; Senate 14.2%.  
 Piccoli: Chamber 5.2%; Senate 21.4%.  
 Fanfani: Chamber 10.1%; Senate 7.4%.  
 La Malfa: Chamber 5.0%; Senate 7.1%.  
 Pandolfi: Chamber 15.4%; Senate 7.4%.  
 Biolletti: Chamber [only] 3.5%.

Cossiga: Chamber [only] 4.2%.  
 No response: Chamber 25.6%;  
 Senate 21.4%.

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ITALY

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON POLITICAL SITUATION

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 5 Dec '78 pp 57, 58, 61

[Report on PANORAMA-Demoskopea opinion poll by Fabrizio Colsson]

[Text] Concerned mainly over unemployment and the high cost of living, more than half of the Italians want a government with the PCI and the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]. But the number of those who have totally lost faith is increasing in an alarming manner.

Skeptical, very lukewarm toward the government, more concerned about immediate than social problems, but still convinced that a positive change can come from the parties of the left. This, in general terms, is the political "identikit" of the Italian of today. This is the finding of an opinion survey conducted throughout the country (covering all social classes, age groups, and voting trends) for PANORAMA by one of the most well-known public opinion poll institutes, Demoskopiea.

This is a moment when the big parties are evaluating with great attention and concern signs of new trends among the voters. The latest sound of alarm has come from Trentino and Alto Adige: the 19 November vote was not positive for any of the major political forces.

Is the present Andreotti Government conducting itself better or worse than the governments which have preceded it in recent years?

Much better	0.9
Better	15.8
More or less the same	46.7
Worse	11.2
Much worse	3.1
Don't know	22.3

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How do you judge the conduct and the political activity of these parties in recent months?

	DC	PCI	PSI
Very positive	2.6	3.6	1.6
Fairly positive	21.1	19.2	16.4
So-so	46.2	45.0	49.4
Rather negative	14.9	17.0	17.8
Completely negative	6.5	5.8	5.9

Is this only a "local phenomenon"? A moderate ebb?" Or is it an expression of dissatisfaction with the present political situation? And how should the emergence of this protest be answered? These are questions which the party leaders are asking themselves. The fate of the Andreotti Government and the prospects of the great majority will probably depend on this reflection.

What are the most important problems which the government should face and resolve with the greatest urgency?

Unemployment	48.0
Public order	39.4
Pensions	15.5
Cost of living	12.4
Schools	12.3
Economy	8.5
Hospitals	7.0
Housing	6.7
Taxes	4.1
Agriculture	3.2
Drugs	2.0

While partial election tests give definite, unappealable results, opinion surveys have the advantage of indicating tendencies and motivating choices in a more articulate way and covering the whole national territory. This is why The Demoskopea-PANORAMA survey may serve as a more inclusive evaluation.

## Without Regrets

A first fact which emerges from the survey is that, in the event of a crisis, the Andreotti Government will not be greatly mourned. Almost half of the persons interviewed (46.7 percent) believe, in fact, that this government has conducted itself "more or less the same" as the governments which preceded it. A slightly or definitely negative judgment is given by 14.3 percent. It should be noted that fairly similar results were recorded in May last year in another PANORAMA-Demoskopea survey, when the government of abstentions was still in.

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One fact which calls for reflection is the increased percentage of persons interviewed who answer "don't know," (now 22.3 percent as compared to 10 percent in May 1977). It is probable that this is due not so much to uncertainty as to detachment or lack of interest in political developments.

The greatest approval for the Andreotti Government comes from central Italy, from the wealthier social classes and, naturally, from DC (Christian Democratic) voters. Those most critical of the Andreotti Government are in the south, workers or students of the left (or of the extreme right).

But on what scale of problems do people judge the conduct of the government? In this area, the change between the answers given a year and a half ago and those given today is noteworthy and in many ways surprising. Leading among the people's concerns today is the problem of unemployment, of jobs. It involves almost half of the persons interviewed (48 percent) reaching higher levels in the center-south, among young people with academic degrees (up to 65 percent). These figures might appear to be expected, but just back in May 1977 these problems were indicated as of the most concern by only 27.8 percent.

At that time the number 1 problem was public order. Today, from the PANORAMA-Demoskopea survey, it appears that the percentage of those putting this problem first has remained constant (39.4 percent) despite the abduction and assassination of Aldo Moro and despite the explosion of terrorism.

The Andreotti Government is composed solely of Christian Democrats. Under the present circumstances is this a positive fact or not?

Yes, it is positive	19.1
No, other political forces should be present in the government	47.8
Don't know	33.2

What other parties should belong to the government?

PCI	56.3
PSI	54.4
PRI [Italian Republican Party]	19.7
PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party]	16.3
PLI [Italian Liberal Party]	14.2
Don't know	16.1

In particular, would it be useful for the country if the PCI had more direct responsibility in the government?

	Among DC voters	
Yes	55.5	33.7
No	31.1	57.0
Don't know	13.7	9.3

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Does the presence of the communists in the majority decisively affect the action of the Andreotti Government? Or does it affect it but not in any substantial way? Or does it have almost no influence?

## Among PCI voters

Decisively	21.7	39.7
Not substantially	34.0	36.0
No influence	8.0	11.0
Don't know	36.3	13.2

Immediately thereafter come the problems of pensions, the cost of living, and schools. Definitely behind come more general subjects such as the economic crisis (only 8.5 percent). It appears obvious that the effects of the crisis itself have led to an increase in concrete, immediate, personal or family problems causing them to prevail even over pressing social problems such as public order. These are circumstances which perhaps also have their effect on the higher number of "don't know" answers to the more political questions.

## On the Left

But how can we have a change for the good in the situation? The Italians, in this sense, still have faith in the parties of the left, the PCI and the PSI. First of all, by a definite majority, (47.8 percent against 19.1 percent) they think that the government should not be composed of simply one party, the DC, but should include other political forces. And the parties they would prefer to see join the government are the PCI (56.3 percent) and the PSI (54.4 percent). The fact should be pointed out that 36.1 percent of the DC voters believe the communist presence in the government would be useful (however, 63.9 percent would prefer the socialists).

A reflection of the polemics within the left can be seen in these figures: only 50.7 percent of the socialist voters would like to see the PCI in the government; but the percentage is even less among the communist voters with regard to the PSI: 40.6 percent. The difference, however, appears to diminish when the question is more articulate and avoids, for instance, the suspicion of an exclusive DC-PCI government relationship (for the socialists) or of a return to the center-left (for the communists). Thus 73.3 percent of the PSI voters believe it would be "useful for the country if the communists also had more direct responsibility in the government."

While it is true that very little enthusiasm is felt about the Andreotti Government, and, in fact, the judgment on it is rather severe, the big parties are not much better off. The conduct of the DC, PCI, and PSI in recent months is judged by the majority as "So-So": 46 percent "So-So" for the DC, 45 percent for the PCI, 49.4 percent for the PSI. The negative evaluations are balanced then against the positive ones.

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But in this area, the most interesting data is that which indicates the judgment of the voters on their own preferred party. Among the Christian Democrats 56.5 percent judge the conduct of Benigno Zaccagnini's DC as "very" or "fairly positive," but 34.2 percent describe it as "So-So." Slightly better is the judgment of the communists on the PCI: 57.4 percent find the activity of the party very or fairly positive, but 32.4 percent answers: "So-So." The socialists are more demanding toward Bettino Craxi: along with 49.5 percent of positive answers we find 9 percent of negative judgments, with 33.7 percent "So-So."

The adherence of the voters to the policies and choices of their own parties is thus substantially confirmed, but without enthusiasm, and indeed with an area of reserved criticism. This may be another proof that the signals which have come from the Trentino-Alto Adige are not solely the result of local phenomena.

## The Formula

The present system of political balances (one-party DC government, big majority) in general does not please or, in any case, causes increasing uncertainty among the voters. And it is a problem which concerns mainly the PCI. Only 21.7 percent of those interviewed in the survey believe, in fact, that the communists decisively affect the activity of the government. Some 34 percent believe that they do affect it, but not in any substantial way, while 8 percent believe that they do not affect it at all. And

Among these politicians, which one might be, considering the present situation, the best prime minister?

Zaccagnini	14.2
Andreotti	11.5
Berlinguer	8.3
Amendola	5.5
Ingrao	4.6
Craxi	3.8
De Martino	2.8
La Malfa	2.8
Fanfani	2.7
Pannella	1.7
Mancini	0.2
Don't know	42.4

a full 36.3 percent answer "don't know," a figure in which the complexity of a political system with unclear boundaries probably weighs heavily. Even among the communist voters, as opposed to 39.7 percent who are convinced that the PCI has a decisive influence on the government's choices, there are 36 percent who believe this influence to be meager.



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There is not, however, any nostalgia for the opposition. Only 16.9 percent of the communists interviewed believe, in fact, that "it would be preferable to have the PCI in the opposition" (a year and a half ago, however, there were far fewer who thought so, 10.7 percent). Among the overall voting public, only 27 percent think that a majority without the PCI would be preferable, while 37 percent consider it a positive factor that, after 30 years, the PCI is no longer in the opposition.

As the political "identikit" of today's Italian is increasingly clearly defined, some constants can be pointed out: the greatest percentage of people who are dissatisfied are to be found in the South and on the islands, among women, and naturally among the underprivileged social classes. But theirs is a discontent which is not expressed along definite political lines (except for some emerging points) but rather in an increase of uncertainty, in the "don't know," perhaps also in a certain detachment from political developments.

Among the persons more definitely politically oriented, on the other hand, the turn toward the left, toward change, remains constant, but there emerges a certain intolerance of the stickiness of the general situation and the way in which the parties are moving. The demand, here, seems to be mainly for a simplification, for clearer choices.

Even the images of the individual leaders have become a little obscured. From the PANORAMA-Demoskopea poll, it appears that the best prime minister, at the present time, is "don't know," (42.4 percent of the answers). All the other percentages are very low. The greatest consensus is on Zaccagnini (14.2 percent), almost three points more than Andreotti.

#### The Leaders

As compared with the May 1977 survey, all of the politicians have lost consensus points. Zac has lost 2 points, Andreotti 1 (and no DC leader has absorbed the 9.6 percent which then chose Moro). Enrico Berlinguer also has fallen from 14.1 percent to 8.3 percent. All of the other leaders, from Bettino Craxi to Ugo La Malfa, from Francisco De Martino to Amintore Fanfani, have lost ground in the index of approval as "best head of government." Hence there emerges a certain attrition among the leaders.

The women definitely prefer Zac, while the men prefer Andreotti, who is particularly popular among the upper middle class and businessmen.

Among the communist voters, beside the 39 percent which prefer Berlinguer there are 24.3 percent who prefer Giorgio Amendola, while the most popular with the voters of the extreme left (Proletarian Democracy, etc.) is Pietro Ingrao, with 35.3 percent.

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Similarly Fanfani, named by only 3.8 percent of the voters, is very successful (26.3 percent) with the right and the extreme right. But Marco Pannella also receives a 10.5 consensus from the right, while he must content himself with 1 percent of the socialist voters.

Altogether the warning signals revealed by all the most recent election tests find a confirmation and a projection in the PANORAMA-Demoskopea poll. This is another element calling for reflection among the parties which are considering the advisability of advancing the date of political elections or which are seeking at least new avenues of contact with a body of voters who are dissatisfied with the way things are going today.

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ITALY

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON PSI CRAXI'S STRATEGY

Discussion of Poll Findings

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 12 Dec 78 pp 46, 47, 49-52

[Article: "How Popular is Craxi?"]

[Text] Up to what point has the "new course" taken by the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] influenced public opinion? What is more important for socialist voters, polemics with the PCI on Leninism or better relations with the communists? A PANORAMA-Demoskopea poll answers these questions.

What is Bettino Craxi's PSI? A still formless nebula, an unknown quantity with some ambiguity, a hope. This is the problematical, complex and uncertain judgment which emerges from the October survey conducted by Demoskopea for PANORAMA.

Craxi's new secretariat is demonstrating a determination to change the ideological and political action of the PSI. Have you heard talk about this?

According to party preference (%)

	DC	PCI	PSI	MSI DN PLI	PRI PSDI	DP PR	Total %
Yes	29	37	49	31.6	44	47.1	26.3
No	71	63	51	68.4	56	52.9	73.7

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What are the most important innovations in the PSI's new course? (This question was put only to those who have heard talk about Craxi's change)

	PSI members and sympathizers (%)	Total %
Separation from the communists	26.5	23.3
Return to Social Democratic positions	2.0	5.7
Renewal of the party	6.1	8.0
Refusal to recognize Leninism	12.2	5.7
No answer	42.9	45.0

The uncertainty arises primarily from the excessively high, certainly higher than average in such polls, number of persons interviewed, who, two and a half years after Craxi took over the secretariat and 8 months away from the Turin congress, still cannot decide on fundamental aspects of the socialist "new course," a matter which the mass media have, nevertheless covered widely. It is quite disconcerting, in fact that 73.7 percent of the persons interviewed (and 51 percent among those who declared themselves members of or sympathizers with the PSI) should not have noticed that something has changed, not only at the top of the party but also its way of conducting politics, in its way of facing concrete problems, of arguing on the political and cultural levels (see the tables published on pages 1 and 2). Not only this: among those who have heard of the change, 45 percent (42.9 percent among the philosocialists) cannot describe the direction of the change. They cannot state their views on the argument opened with the PCI on Leninism. Some 63 percent have no idea, for instance, of where Craxi's policy will lead the PSI.

What can one say? In cases like this the temptation to blame the numbers is great. But it is almost never well-founded. It can be noted, however, that the validity of these polls (which the parties themselves use) can be verified months later, for instance, by new surveys on the same model. A new check, hence, will come. For the time being, it is legitimate to ask somewhat disturbing questions concerning the interest public opinion has in the parties (and which recent electoral episodes have already raised). Also, with regard to the PSI, indications can be deduced which seem most significant at a time when questions concerning the capacity for influence and penetration of the party concern its leaders (see Bettino Craxi interview on page 7).

One fact emerges as certain: Craxi's leadership and the leadership of the new group of leaders which emerged from the Turin congress last March is not under discussion. (see table on following page). Among the philosocialists interviewed almost 90 percent prefer his line to the line followed before, which received approval from just barely 6 percent. The consensus is equally evident among the people interviewed generally: 56.9 percent prefer the Craxi line and only 13.4 percent is of the opposite opinion.

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Do you think that the Craxi line is to be preferred to that of the previous secretariat? (The question was addressed only to those who have heard talk about the Craxi change).

According to the party preferred (%)

	DC	PCI	PSI	MSI/Dn PLI	PRI PSDI	Dp/Pr	Total (%)
For the interest of the country							
Craxi line	67.9	23.5	89.8	100.0	72.7	12.5	56.9
Previous line	1.8	43.1	6.1	--	9.1	25.0	13.4
Don't know	30.4	33.3	6.1	--	18.2	62.5	29.8
For the interest of the PSI							
Craxi line	58.9	33.3	76.6	16.7	72.7	37.5	48.9
Previous line	5.4	35.3	6.1	16.7	9.1	12.5	11.8
Don't know	37.5	31.4	16.3	66.7	18.2	37.5	39.3

Craxi's PSI has brought into discussion the Marxist-Leninist tradition which inspires the left, thus provoking an argument with the PCI. Do you believe that this is a positive thing which will lead to a clarification within the left, or do you think it is negative?

According to the party preferred (%)

	DC	PCI	PSI	PLI MSI/DN	PRI PSDI	Dp/Pr
Positive	36.8	31.6	53.5	63.2	48.0	52.9
Negative	9.3	31.6	15.8	5.3	12.0	23.5
Don't know	54.4	36.8	29.7	31.6	40.0	23.5

According to the party preferred (%)

	DC	PCI	PSI	PLI MSI/DN	PRI PSDI	Dp/Pr
Debate	29.0	14.0	36.6	36.8	36.0	35.3
Agreement	25.9	68.4	46.5	21.1	44.0	47.1
Don't know	45.1	17.6	15.8	36.8	20.0	17.6

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Overall what is your judgment on the conduct and the political activity of the PSI in recent months?

	Total (%)
Very positive	1.6
Fairly positive	16.4
So-So	49.4
Rather negative	17.8
Completely negative	5.9
No answer	9.1

## Galvanizing

A psychological effect (important in politics) which was anticipated, a galvanizing effect on the rank and file and the traditional electorate can be said to be confirmed. While bearing in mind, in fact, that the poll precedes the election defeat in Trentino, a good 59.4 percent of the socialist sympathizers interviewed are convinced that, if a vote were called today, the PSI would improve its own positions. (see table on page 6). The cautious (who believe that the result would be equal to the previous one, that is to say the 9.6 percent won on 20 June 1976) remain less than 30 percent. Only a very few (6.9 percent) anticipate a decline.

The consolidation of the socialist leading groups appears to have been an accomplished fact for some time now. Dissension and differences between the secretary and the strongest component of the majority, the left, which have recently come to the surface are to a considerable extent in the nature of the normal internal dialectics of a party (see article on page 10) and, in any case, not such as to impair its compactness, at least not for the time being. However, in order to get to the bottom of the matter in a survey of this kind, it would have been necessary to sound out the periphery of the parties, their intermediate cadres in a detailed way. The survey which PANORAMA proposes instead is addressed to the broadest public opinion of the nation in order to verify the political impact of the socialist "new course."

In this connection the peculiar condition in which the PSI finds itself should be underlined: it proposes a political strategy (that of the alternative), whose outlines are not definite. It does not expect to carry it out in a brief period of time. The two principal premises for the application of this strategy, on the other hand, stand out. These are marked differentiation from the PCI and the pursuit of an election victory which will rebalance positions within the left. Someone has said that the socialists have placed their bet elections.

Certainly the image of the PSI, primarily restrained in the emergency majority, does not appear clear. Viewed from certain aspects it may give an impression of ambiguity which the survey picks up, particularly with regard to its relations with the communists.

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## Arbitrary

It is significant that the Craxi line finds great appreciation among the Christian Democrats (67.9), in the Republican and social democratic parties (72.7 percent) and on the right (in which the authors of the survey rather arbitrarily group together Liberals and members of the the Italian Social Movement and of the National Democratic party). The latter group nevertheless, shows an index of indisputable approval, 100 percent. The opinion of those sympathizing with other leftist parties who were interviewed was quite the opposite. Thus, approval from the philocommunists does not exceed 23.5 percent (43.1 percent preferred the PSI before Craxi) and those who support the DP [Proletarian Democratic Party] and the PR [Radical Party] express a very meager index of preference: 12.5 percent.

There is no doubt that public opinion on the left looks with suspicion on Craxi's attitude, while the public opinion which follows the moderate parties and the parties of the right sees in it the hope of driving the PCI back into the opposition.

## Preference

An ambiguity? It appears possible to say so with reference to two other elements provided by the survey. The first (see table on page 6): among the socialists interviewed, 73.3 percent favor bringing the communists into the government and only 19.8 percent would be glad to see them in the opposition. The second element (see table on page 3): a majority among the socialists (46.5 percent) would prefer to seek an agreement with the PCI on political problems and on concrete matters to rather than to conduct an ideological debate, although such a debate still polls, among the socialists, a not inconsiderable consensus, 36.6 percent.

It should be pointed out that the preference for seeking concrete agreements rather than theoretical divisions is widespread among the left: 47.1 percent of the Proletarian Democracy sympathizers interviewed (a very high figure when it is considered that in this figure the radicals are added, in a rather spurious manner, to the parties to the left of the PCI) and a good 68.4 percent of the communists. This latter figure is truly significant because it eliminates several current interpretations suggesting that the rank and file of the PCI are strongly antagonistic to the PSI, bearing a persistent grudge against the socialists and tending to prefer even direct relations with the DC.

Things appear to be different, even if it is not only public opinion of the right which has grasped in the Craxi effort the element of separation from and polemics with the PCI. The survey, when it proposes to the persons interviewed that they indicate the most marked characteristic of the "new course," finds much confusion and dispersion of ideas, but also a majority on the term "separation from the communists," 23.3 percent which rises to 26.5 percent

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among PSI sympathizers (see table on page 2). Certainly this latter element has a positive side, the revival of socialist autonomy. This is a theme which returns in the consideration of the debate on Leninism which does, indeed, still find instrumental support (63.2 percent) of the right but also the massive support of the PSI sympathizers (53.5 percent) and of the extreme left area. This is beside the significant support (31.6 percent) of the philocommunists interviewed.

With the Craxi secretariat will the PSI emerge renewed and close to the European models (A) or will it align itself with old social democratic and liberal socialist positions (B)?

	PSI sympathizers and members (%)	Total (%)
Answer A	55.4	21.4
Answer B	14.9	15.2
Don't know	29.7	63.4

Do you consider it useful for the country that the communists, too, should have more direct responsibilities?

	PSI sympathizers and members (%)	Total (%)
Yes	73.3	55.5
No	19.8	31.1
Don't know	6.9	13.7

If a vote were held today, would the PSI become stronger?

	PSI sympathizers and members (%)	Total (%)
Yes	59.4	26.6
No	6.9	23.5
It would remain the same	29.7	41.0
No answer	4.0	9.3



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Bettino Craxi Interview

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 12 Dec 78 pp 49, 50, 51

[Report by Pasquale Nonno on PANORAMA interview with PSI Secretary Bettino Craxi: "Altogether, I am pleased with it"; date and place not given]

[Text] While expressing some reservations on the method used, Craxi declares himself satisfied with the results of the poll. He particularly appreciates the percentage of the communists who approve of him.

Bettino Craxi attacks with a criticism. Putting his hands out, he says, "some of the questions in the poll are presented in a peculiar way. When the questions are vague, the answers have very little probability of being definite. Let us, therefore, discuss the results of the poll considering them, in some way, as relative and hypothetical values..."

Having established this premise, Craxi consented to answer the questions put to him by PANORAMA on the most significant results emerging from the poll concerning his party.

[Question] Among those interviewed who were aware of the change which has taken place in the PSI there is broad consensus. It is very broad among those interviewed who are party sympathizers. Do you believe at this point that the "Craxi line" is definitely established in the PSI?

[Answer] A consensus on the new line was fully expressed at the Turin Congress. Thereafter later clarifications and initiatives further favored the expansion of the area of internal consensus. To see this confirmed, naturally, pleases me very much. I believe it very unlikely we can turn back.

[Question] The Craxi line is given the lowest consensus by the left: not more than 23.5 percent among the communists. Only 12.5 percent among the Proletarian Democrats and the radicals.

[Answer] The figures concerning the area of the left, that is, where the competition has become the most keen seem to me fairly logical. Nevertheless, the 23.5 percent among the communists who prefer the new PSI line is already a fine affirmation. It is a consistent minority. As for Pannella, who is so much against everyone, such a niggardly index of approval toward us may perhaps indicate a hidden preference.

[Question] There is, however, another important fact: the approval of the Craxi line is very high among the Christian Democrats (67.9 percent), social democrats and republicans (72.7 percent) and the right of all kinds, liberals, MSI, National Democracy (actually 100 percent).

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[Answer] For the social democrats this fact reflects political judgments formulated by at least the majority of their representatives. The same cannot be said about the PRI and particularly La Malfa. The information picked up, in fact, does not follow many of their expressed opinions and the line they have followed up to now. Also from the Christian Democrats I would have expected worse. The PLI cannot be confused with the right. The PLI and the PSI, although on different sides, maintain between themselves relations marked by great reciprocal respect. The right, instead, sees only the polemics between us and the communists, while we see the abysmal difference, the 100 percent difference which separates us from it.

[Question] Altogether 56.9 percent of the persons interviewed prefer the Craxi line to the previous line. But the figure is even higher in the South (63.5 percent). Does this not appear surprising to you?

[Answer] I would not say so. The figure reflects the trend of the voters as it has been expressed up to now in frequent partial elections.

[Question] Altogether 73.7 percent of the persons interviewed have no idea that their secretariat is imposing a new course on the PSI (a good 51 percent among the socialist sympathizers). There is uncertainty and confusion about its significance even among those who were aware of a change. What significance do you attach to such little understanding?

[Answer] These figures appear to me very improbable. Particularly the figure referring to PSI members and sympathizers. Evidently these are very distant sympathizers. A national projection of the 14 May election returns assigned to us 14 percent of the votes. If this 4.5 advance was achieved when 73.7 percent of the voters had no idea of the change which had occurred within the PSI, this should mean that our possibilities of expansion are excellent. The figure, therefore, should be considered very encouraging.

[Question] The controversy over Leninism appears really to have taken very little hold...

[Answer] I tend to believe that the percentage of those who know little or absolutely nothing about Leninism is also much higher than 59 percent. Also a bungled question on socialist or social democratic models and experiences could not fail to receive confused and bungled answers.

[Question] In any case, does an inadequate propaganda and organizational capability on the part of the party affect these answers?

[Answer] I believe that the difficulties of transmitting political messages may be in general (and hence not particularly within the PSI) largely underestimated. They are much greater than is normally believed. This involves the necessity of looking into and clarifying problems not only of propaganda and organization, but also of language, image, and repeated and specific

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communication. The PSI, more than the two major parties, has to pay for the weakness of its social installation and the inadequate peripheral and sectorial articulation of its structures.

[Question] Can these inadequacies explain the Trentino defeat? And may not the lack of understanding of your line indicate, perhaps, that it is not very popular?

[Answer] The inadequacies I have indicated were not more serious in the Trentino than elsewhere, even if the organizational fragility of the party explains why it may be more easily exposed to erosion when slates of specifically local interest or strongly and directly competitive slates are involved. If, despite this, the PSI has, overall, shown in recent months a definite tendency toward electoral recovery, this means that our policy already has a large popular audience.

[Question] The majority of those interviewed understood that the change consists in a break with the PCI. How do you judge this orientation?

[Answer] I believe that the basic fact which we have clearly brought out, that is--a more distinct sense of the autonomous role of the socialists and of their historic and ideological identity which is different from that of the communists--has been underlined.

[Question] Does it not appear to you that this fact may prove right those who, like Riccardo Lombardi, for instance, have considered certain polemics of yours with the PCI too sharp?

[Answer] If Lombardi said this, he is mistaken. If anything we have been subjected to sharp polemics by the communists.

[Question] In answer to the question whether it is better for the PCI and the PSI to engage in ideological debate or to seek agreements on concrete points, only 18.6 were in favor of the former hypothesis and 37.4 in favor of the latter. In favor of agreement were 46.5 percent of the socialists (against 36.6 percent) and 68.4 percent of the communists...

[Answer] I am of the opinion expressed by the majority of those interviewed and I am convinced that ideological debate should not in any way preclude a search for convergence and agreement with the PCI on concrete objectives. I am not in agreement on the "qualunquistica" argument which rejects debate on principles, considering such debate abstract and evasive. In reality, behind every concrete solution there is always, or almost always, a choice of principle. I am also impressed by other figures concerning the PCI sympathizers.

[Question] That 31.6 percent in favor of bringing Leninist tradition under discussion as opposed to an equal 31.6 percent against it?

[Answer] Correct. But I am also interested in the similar balance found in another figure, still referring to the PCI, according to which 33.3 percent

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considers the present policy best for the PSI, while not more than 35.3 percent are reported to be opposed. If this were the case, the deductions to be inferred would be at least two. The first: the confirmation of an old deep rooted conviction of mine concerning the fact that the revision we are asking of the PCI is being held up because of lack of determination or courage on the part of its leaders and not because of immaturity or fideistic attachment on the part of the rank and file to traditions, as people would now like to have us believe.

[Question] The second consideration?

[Answer] It is that all the attempts which are made from time to time, or systematically at certain moments, to demonstrate that the PSI has abandoned the straight path (has broken with its past, etc.) and is running the risk of being precipitated into hell, when it is all added up, do not have broad support even within the PCI. So it would be as well to abandon this argument.

Split Within PSI Averted

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 12 Dec 78 pp 51, 52

[Article by Filippo Ceccarelli and Pasquale Nonno: "Put your hand here, Signorile"]

[Text] The split between Craxi supporters and the socialist left appeared inevitable. But, at the last moment, a confidential talk between the secretary and his assistant secretary put things back in order.

The site of the talk, prepared and held in great secrecy, was Bettino Craxi's private office in Tomacelli street, a couple of steps away from the PSI. Participants: the socialist secretary and his assistant secretary, Claudio Signorile, leader of the left. In 2 hours, in a private tete-a-tete, the morning of 29 November, they succeeded in putting together again an agreement which scarcely a day earlier had appeared about to fall apart, threatening to throw the PSI into chaos.

Those responsible for the worst clash, Gianni de Michelis, organizational leader and restless representative of the left, and PSI administrator Rino Formica, an impetuous and loyal follower of Craxi, had already been obliged a few hours earlier to sign an armistice, if not a lasting peace.

Battle

In the preceding days, for the first time after the Turin congress, there had been an open battle within the PSI ruling majority. The climax was reached at the 23 and 24 November meeting of the leadership. The clash had been mainly political: Craxi, backed by Enrico Manca and Giacomo Mancini, had fiercely attacked the Andreotti Government. The left, believing that their objective

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was to topple it, lined up against the secretary. But there had also been a clash over the administration of the party. Formica had accused De Michelis of being responsible for the defeat in Alto Adige, declaring: "You sent 60 inept activists up there." And De Michelis had answered acidly; "It is your fault for denying us funds. We spent nothing compared to the money spread around by Marco Pannella."

It was in fact, the election defeat which had inflamed the socialists. "Necessarily," declared Silvano Labriola, former protege of De Martino, now maintaining an independent position, "when there is no policy and everything is staked on election victories, defeats hurt twice as much." For Giovanni Mosca, former PSI assistant secretary, the compromise reached between Craxi and the left was fatally destined to reel under the pressure of political problems and the struggle between the two big peripheral groups.

Indeed, tensions had been accumulating. Even before the Trentino elections a meeting had been held in great secrecy at the Raphael Hotel in Rome, between a few of the most faithful of Craxi's old guard, such as Loris Fortuna, Silvano Signori, and Stefano Servadei, then Venice Mayor Mario Rigo and a few former Mancini followers, such as Antonio Landolfi and Antonio Caldoro. "Certainly not to form a separate group," Caldoro said, "but only to oppose the attempts of the left to dominate." And following are the latest episodes. Sardinia: Giuseppe Tocco, pro-Craxi deputy, replaced in the secretariat by Paolo Ateni. The Abruzzo: all of the federations to the left. Trieste: Secretary Gianfranco Carbone, Craxi's man, ousted and Augusto Segliene, Signorile's man elected. "The list would be long. The organizational management of the left is authoritarian besides being inefficient," Landolfi says, "because it leads us to election disasters."

De Michelis answers punctiliously: "The changes in the federations have occurred for local reasons or else they were ordered by the center: and acting in cooperation. This is true for the Val D'Aosta, too, where we kicked out corrupt administrators. Or in Trieste, where we refused to be associated with the local 'qualunquisti'."

It is a fact that the broadside attacks against the left have coagulated diverse forces around Craxi: Enrico Manca, former Mancini supporters, young De Martino supporters, such as Nicola Capria and Mauro Seppia, and perhaps, Salvatore Lauricella himself, the PSI leader in Sicily.

Landolfi is explicit in enumerating the basic subjects on which the left disagrees with the secretary. It does not accept the new PSI image drawn by Craxi in his now famous essay. It is opposed to the flexible attitude (which the secretary is said to favor) toward the radicals and local phenomena. It looks with distrust on Eurosocialism. It insists on the "concept of an alternative which Craxi, instead, tends to weaken."

But the arguments of Gandolfi and his group have been relegated, at least temporarily, to the background by other criticisms of the secretariats of

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a definitely different mark. Rome deputy Nevol Querci, of the leadership, who describes himself as tied ("but only culturally) to De Martino, maintains that "the image we have projected abroad is that of Craxi, that is to say, the image of a liberal democratic-inspired socialist party. We have launched a hundred messages to this effect: the polemics on Leninism, on the Moro case, even the conference on information. Now we have this bad news from Trentino. We must realize that we cannot hide behind alleged organizational mistakes. The truth is that this line has limited influence in the country. And it does not represent all of the party. Various cultural trends coexist within the PSI. A synthesis is needed."

This is a widespread demand as also widespread is the opposition to the prospect of creating two rigid opposing groups. "It would be deadly," Labriola observes. And Giacomo Mancini does not think otherwise. "I am fiercely against the formation of new groups. We have seen such things before and we recall them with sadness." Milan Mayor Carlo Tognoli, finally, maintains that "the process of interpenetration between the left and the Craxi group must continue."

## Pact of Steel

All of the above are considerations which surely favored the renewed Tomacelli Street agreement which is based on a pact of steel. What does this consist of? Its first aspect concerns the administration of the party. The work sectors will be revised. Relations will be improved to avoid too personal administration and the leadership group will be broadened. The first concrete sign of this: Vincenzo Balzamo reconfirmed to lead the parliamentary group in the chamber of deputies, while his assistant, Giuseppe Di Vagno, who appeared destined, as a Craxi follower, to succeed him, will enter the administration.

Then there is the political aspect. For the months ahead, up to the European elections, the PSI will continue its confrontation with the PCI. It will seek an agreement with the social democrats and republicans in order to gain more overall weight with the Christian Democrats. It will support the government, although it may criticize it. But the agreement does not stop here.

Craxi and Signorile also spoke about the prospects which will open up after this spring, agreeing that the one-party Andreotti Government will not be able to hold out until the end of the legislature. Taking into account the DC veto on bringing the communists into the government, and the demand which is being felt from the Botteghe Oscure that some step forward be taken, they have taken into consideration, for the first time and in an organic way, the possibility of the socialists returning to the government, but as part of an understanding which would include the PCI in the majority. The most immediate problem to achieve an objective of this kind is to build, or better, to rebuild, on new bases, a closer relationship with the PCI. "Now this is possible, Cicchitto maintains, "because we have fully restored the image of an autonomous PSI, which does not conceal its differences and can, therefore, negotiate as an equal."

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PSI Secretary Bettino Craxi

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ITALY

STEEL WAR BETWEEN EEC, 'BRESCIANI'

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 8 Dec 78 pp 147-153

/Article by Aldo Santini: "Concrete-Reinforcing Rod, King of Brescia"/

/Text/ Brescia, November--One-to-one is the score in the EEC /European Economic Community/ war against industrialists who violate Community laws.

Over the past two years the EEC has waged a continuous war against the steel mills of Brescia, bombarding the "lords of the reinforcing rod" with accusations, investigations, restrictions, and fines. For 2 years now the economic newspapers have been sounding the death knell of this industry which employs 14,000 workers, provides jobs to 7,000 more persons, and has made Brescia one of Europe's richest cities: for example, "Demise of the Happy Reinforcing Rod Era," "The Reinforcing Rod Will Be Flattened," "EEC Trains Gunsights on Brescian Reinforcing Rods," "EEC Aiming To Crush Italian Steel Mini-Mills." "I Have Nothing Left But Eyes With Which To Cry, Says Luigi Lucchini."

Lucchini is the baron of the reinforcing rod makers, or rather their king. He is being called Luigi I, king of Brescia, and his reign extends beyond the city. He has a mill in Piedmont, where he employs Jehovah's Witnesses because they would die before going on strike, since their religion prohibits it. And recently he has laid hands on a venerable, prestigious Tuscan industry, the Magona.

Lucchini in tears? The Bresciani hardly think so. "Above all, nothing ever goes wrong for him," they say. "In 1969, as the bottom falls out of the market, taking reinforcing rod pioneer Carlo Antonini's fortune with it, he buys the mill for a song--900 million /lire/--and the market immediately surges upward. In 1974, he buys into Wuehrer, which at the time is undergoing a crisis because of the freeze on beer prices, and immediately, the freeze is lifted."

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Lucchini is a weather-vane of business interests. He is in banks, insurance companies, agriculture, animal husbandry, hotels. He was the first to diversify the iron and steel industry, specializing in structural shapes. He was the first to pay billions to ransom his son, who was kidnapped when it became known that he was the highest taxpayer in Italy. But he was also the first to cover himself with Lloyd's of London. Farsightedness is his greatest gift. He is even free of the unlucky extracurricular activities of his rival, Oddino Pietra, whose investment in his thoroughbred Sirlad was halved in one lost race. Pietra has gross billings of 70 billion, and he, 55; but Pietra has 1,200 employees, and he, barely 700.

Lucchini now presides over the Association of Brescia Industrialists, which groups about 1,000 enterprises totaling 85,000 employees, the third largest in Italy after those of Milan and Turin. And as its president he has issued an SOS and has contested the restrictions imposed by the EEC on the steel mills of his province.

Lucchini is the bete noire of the unions. He took over Erede Gnutti, the large nonferrous metals plant and shut it down for 10 months, at a cost of 1 billion lire, because the union prevented him from managing it. He won that battle. But he has been unable to win the one with Viscount Etienne Davignon, the Belgian commissioner for industry in the EEC, who in turn is Lucchini's bete noire.

It is Davignon, in fact, who persecutes the Brescia producers of reinforcing rods. It is Davignon who has fought to impose higher prices permitting the Belgian, French and German mills to keep their heads above water. It is Davignon who sees to it that fines are levied against reinforcing rod producers "guilty" of being too competitive and of lowering the imposed prices.

And again, it is Davignon who goes to the extent of nit-picking of Lucchini's rod producers, claiming that they are able to indulge in the luxury of undercutting tariffed prices because they are outlaws, because they fail to pay the "levy"—that is, the first European tax—into the common fund, because they do not always strictly comply with existing social norms, because they evade taxes, because they are in arrears in settlement of current accounts, because they cheat on weights.

True, there is quite a scandalous anthology on breaches of the rules by the Brescian rod makers, those "Japs of the EEC," so adventurous and clever, aggressive and uncultured, unscrupulous, cynical, ever ready to covenant with the devil. It ranges from doctoring of weights by means of the mercury pump, which unbalanced the load of rod on the truck or trailer upsetting the reading on the scale, to inflation of shipments for the Aswan dam after it became known that there were no scales for weighing them at the Soviet unloading site.

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The Bresciani, obviously, minimize the water down. They point out that the true king of the reinforcing rod is Carlo Rumi, from Bergamo, not Brescia, producer of 1 million tons a year with annual billings of 80 billion lire, and the one most often fined by the EEC. However, they cannot deny the two most recently invented gimmicks for dodging the pegged prices: the heavy ton and the penalty.

The simplest one is the heavy ton, which consists of delivering 1,200 kilograms at the price of 1,000 kilograms (the metric ton). The penalty gimmick is more elaborate. The supplier writes a contract stipulating the EEC-imposed minimum price, but adds a clause providing for payment of a stated penalty for each day of delay in delivery. He then delays it sufficiently, by arrangement with the client, to arrive at the agreed discount.

Eastern Competition

"That is the only way we can sell," say the Brescia rod makers. "The building crisis has ruined us. And the competition from Third World countries is frightful. South Korea, for instance, is selling at cut-throat prices. But also the Soviet Union. And Davignon, with all his idle talk, does nothing to protect us. To say nothing of our own Foreign Trade Ministry."

The Third World countries produce an excess of steel, are starved for hard currency, and beleaguer the EEC, which maintains steel prices artificially high. An island paradise for this army of aggressors. Anyone scandalized by gimmicks labeled "made in Brescia" is a hypocrite.

In Italy alone, 6 million tons of steel a year enter from the East and Far East, through the Chinese container method adopted by our profiteers who have partner organizations in Switzerland, financiers in Luxembourg, et cetera. Well: the domestic market now absorbs 20 million tons and, to survive, the Italian steel industry must produce 30 million. The arithmetic is simple. We are inflicting injury upon ourselves. The importing groups are realizing legendary profits. And it is the taxpayers who must make up the deficits in the public enterprises.

The Brescia steel mills are privately owned, and if they go in the red they are finished. Thus, the cynicism and brutality of the "lords of the reinforcing rod" find their justification in the need to survive. This also explains in many cases the pragmatism of the workers who oppose the hard labor union line. The experts say that the union became strong too late, when the heyday of the rod makers had ended. Today, the mind-boggling profits of the 1950's and 1960's are no longer possible. It is no longer a seller's market. The cost of electricity has zoomed skyhigh. To remain competitive, the rod makers have made substantial investments. They have gone into debt with the banks. And the golden bonanza of scrap has also come to an end.

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Scrap steel is the god of the Brescia steel industry. The best scrap is war scrap. War is the grand producer of scrap. The rod makers drool over armored vehicles. Tank steel is in its virgin state, unpainted, uncoated, and needs no purification. The most luscious vehicle is the Soviet upper-armored tank, with its formidable armor-plate, caterpillar track, turret and bolt yields.

Scrap Steel Gold Mines

The golden bonanza of scrap reached its apogee during the Vietnam War. There were rod makers who leased entire fleets of ships and went off to Saigon to gather up thousands of destroyed armored vehicles and other scrap, as long as it was steel. With the end of the Vietnam War, the massive use of armored vehicles came to its end. The Yom Kippur War was the last to be exploited. Brescia's misfortune was its short duration. Lebanon, if anything, brings another kind of life-blood to this city: dollars for the purchase of small arms--the Beretta Docet.

Davignon speaks of sales below cost as a disastrous spiral for the European steel industry. But Brescia replies: the disastrous spiral is the Common Market's regimentation, which is destroying our steel mills. And it accuses Davignon of leading the EEC's heavy industry to ruin. One cannot expect to protect industries that are decrepit and never modernized, sclerosed, and incapable of keeping up with the competition, by setting up high prices to be imposed on all the producers controlled by Brussels, while world prices are dropping.

Such a policy brings neither new vitality nor youth to old enterprise. It merely delays their collapse, and leads the new efficient ones to suicide by denying them their sole means of coping with the Third World countries: competitiveness.

Why do the Brescia steel mills sell concrete-reinforcing rods at lower prices than the French, Germans and Belgians?

The answer reveals the steel industry's problem. Brescia succeeds in producing a ton of steel in 4 hours, for which the French need 7.5 hours, the Germans 6.37, and the rest of Italy 5.48. The European average is never less than 6.38 hours. But one thing is obvious: The Brescian rod makers carry no clout whatever against the Krupps, the Thyssens, and the Arbeds.

As if this were not enough, the Italian representatives in Brussels who deal with Davignon are tied with double knots to the big runs of the Italian steel industry who took such a beating at the hands of Brescia that they were compelled by Brescia to abandon the manufacture of reinforcing rods.

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Neck and Neck With the Germans

In an Italy considered to be the black sheep of the EEC, aided with ill grace by widely publicized and propagandized loans, endured with glaring insufferableness, there is at least one sector where private capital has invested unsparingly at the proper moment to avoid missing the bus of technological progress, which is the spearhead of the European steel industry. And instead of being taken as a model, it is punished and penalized. Punished simply because it is able to produce better than the German, Belgian and French "firms" and at lower cost.

After having denounced Italy because nothing ever works here, because we have too many strikes and too much absenteeism, because labor costs are too high, because there is too little inclination to work, Brussels now denounces and fines an Italian industrial complex which functions too well, which works with fierce determination, which works too fast and is therefore able to compete with the Japanese, the Koreans, the Soviets, and with the South Africans who have the advantage of cheap, or almost unpaid, labor. It is the triumph of the absurd. The Brescias, with grim frankness, ask themselves; "What, then, is the nature of this beast, this EEC?"

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ITALY

STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY MINISTRY

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 6 Dec 78 pp 23-24

/Article by Claudio Torneo: "Onward, Prodi"7

/Text7 To conduct the complex lot of the sectorial plans for industry there are barely four government officials. The inspectors charged with verifying the applications for price increases submitted by enterprises to the Inter-ministerial Price Committee (CIP) number not more than 20, some of whom have precarious employer-employee relationships. One-hundred twenty-five thousands applications waiting to be examined are pigeon-holed in the archives of the patent office. For any authorization whatever, even the most commonplace, industries must wait months and months, if not years. On paper, the new minister of industry, Romano Prodi, inherits from his predecessor, Carlo Donat Cattin, a great many powers. But in the great Fascist style palace on Via Veneto which houses the ministry offices, he will find precious little means for exercising them. In short, he is a Prodi without an army /evidently a play on the similarity of his name to the Italian word "prode" meaning a brave, valiant person7. For once, industrialists, union leaders, and experts are in agreement: they consider the operation of the Ministry of Industry disastrous. "In some respects it is like an orchestra complete with conductor and sheet music, but no musicians," says the jurist, Sabino Cassese, one of the major scholars of government administrative problems.

Although a minor ministry until the end of the 1960's (its employees used to define it ironically as "little more than ministry of handicrafts"), it has since then acquired an impressive number of powers. The minister's placet determines the funding and credits to be granted to enterprises for various purposes (closely examining the General Accounting Office's last report, Cassese discovered that the Ministry of Industry had granted incentives even to agricultural enterprises involved in zootechny, viticulture and floriculture). It is the Ministry of Industry, through CIP, that superintends the policy on those prices that are controlled (from medicine to fertilizers, from cement to gasoline). It is the Ministry of Industry's responsibility to administer the energy plan, as well as the nuclear choices and contract commitments it entails, and to keep watch over ENEL /National Council for Economy and Labor7. The Ministry of Industry also determines

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national policy on insurance matters: from the setting of automobile insurance rates to the management of the insurance companies.

And its ascendancy is still on the rise. As the law on industrial reconstruction becomes more and more operative, and as the new law on the financial reconstruction of enterprises goes into effect, the Ministry of Industry will become one of the major national programming centers, second only to the Ministry of the Treasury. Without the industry minister's stamp of approval, there can be no distribution of the 8,000 billion lire provided by the law on reconversions (this sum includes funds allocated for state shareholdings, the investment of which must, however, be in accordance with the sectorial plans); nor, without his approval, can the plans be put into effect which have been drawn up by the banking consortiums for the financial reconstruction of enterprises in crisis.

Then there is a myriad of apparently minor and for the most part unknown prerogatives and functions, which explain why in the race for appointments the Ministry of Industry has always held a special attraction.

Heading these is a long string of supervised entities (see chart), a mass of collective organizations, a number of financial managements outside the budget (this is the case, for example, of the gigantic electric power sector's settlements funds, whose ready assets are equal to those of the entire ministry). Every possible and imaginable kind of industrial authorization must flow from this ministry, including standards for methane bottles and type-approval of farming equipment.


The resources available to the ministry to handle this mass of powers and functions are very modest. Its employees, numbering almost 1,500, are unmotivated, frustrated, and, except for a limited number of cases, devoid of assigned responsibilities. The six general directorates and the almost 80 divisions are entirely absorbed in routine and thus excluded from the more important activities of the ministry. The sole exception is the Directorate of Energy, but some maliciously maintain that this fact is explained by the presence at its head of Giuseppe Ammassari, an especially loyal friend of Donat Cattin.

The lack of personnel in the technical offices is especially noticeable. The Directorate of Industrial Production, in the processing of applications for incentive loans, has not infrequently found it necessary to recur to officials of the very credit institution that would eventually issue the loan. Personnel lent by ENEL, SIP /Italian Telephone Company/, banks, and state-controlled enterprises are to be found in all of the related offices. The CIP inspectors must often accept the validity of the information and calculations submitted by the enterprises, because they have neither the staff nor the instruments necessary to conduct verifications. In the patent office, the reorganization of which has been under discussion for 15 years, the staff has diminished from 102 in 1969 to 56 today, (messengers, clerks and secretaries included). The patents bulletin published monthly by the ministry has not gone beyond information and patents issued near the end of 1969.

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For some time now, the ministry has functioned only thanks to the "parallel structure" of experts and collaborators which the various ministers have created. The phenomenon assumed inordinate dimensions under Ciriaco de Mita and Donat Cattin, so much so that 2 years ago the labor section of the ministry presented a report to the attorney general of the republic and to the General Accounting Office. The union leaders, who operate within the ministry, maintain that the inefficiency of the administrative apparatus is a direct result of the plan to transform the Ministry of Industry into a power center. And for a long time they have been asking the successive ministers in the push-button office on Via Veneto for a serious effort at reorganization. With Donat Cattin they got nowhere. They will reiterate the request to Prodi at their first official meeting.

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Key:

1. Under the Minister of Industry's armchair
2. Minister  
Romano Prodi
3. Undersecretaries  
Gianfranco Aliverti--Carlo Baldi--Gisuppe Sinesio
4. Office of the former Directorate General of  
Handicrafts and Small Industries  
Director: Almerico D'Andrea
5. National Patent Office for Inventions, Models and Trademarks  
Director: Sebastiano Sampero
6. Office of Planning and Research  
Director: Giovanni Nasi
7. Legislative Office  
Director: Antonio Troccoli
8. General Directorate of Insurance  
Director: Carlo Gradi
9. General Directorate of Mines
10. General Directorate of Commerce and Industrial Consumption  
Director: Fernando Cantile
11. General Directorate of General Affairs  
Director: Nicola Jorio
12. General Directorate of Industrial Production  
Director: Eugenio Carbone
13. General Directorate of Energy Sources and Basis Industries  
Director: Giuseppe Ammassari
14. S  
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t Provident Insurance Fund for Athletes  
i Italian Reinsurance Union  
t Italian Actors' Institution  
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15. Chambers of Commerce  
Autonomous Organization of Art Exhibitions of Cremona  
Autonomous Organization of Department Stores of Padova  
Special Corporation for the Free Trade Zone of Gorizia  
Inter-Chamber Consortium for the Construction of  
a New Customhouse in Como  
Documentation Center for International Lumber Trade
16. National Agency for the Cellulose and Paper Industry  
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